Introduction
This contribution seeks to provide an answer to the dilemma caused by the exclusion clause of Article 1F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereinafter: Refugee Convention). In describing this dilemma, the focus will be on the absolute prohibition of torture and hence, the absolute prohibition of refoulement to a country where there is a real risk of torture. These prohibition is laid down in a number of Treaty provisions, like Article 3 of the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter: ECHR) and Article 3 of the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereinafter: UN Convention against Torture), respectively. It will be assumed that the person is suspected of having committed torture himself. It will further be assumed that he is excluded on the exclusion ground of Article 1F(a) Refugee Convention, torture being seen as either a crime against humanity or a war crime. 1 If a person, for whom there is a real risk of torture in his home country, is excluded from protection because of one of the exclusion grounds of Article 1F, two problems may arise: (a) he is not protected against the risk of torture, and (b) he is not prosecuted for his crime. In this essay, a solution is sought in the principle "aut dedere aut judicare". A State excluding a person on the basis of Article 1 F Refugee Convention should be obliged either to prosecute this person or to extradite/surrender the person to a State or to an international criminal tribunal, respectively, which will ensure that the person is prosecuted.
Though it is clear that (a) non-refoulement is a basic principle of refugee and human rights law and that (b) criminal prosecution of those accused of committing torture is a fundamental requirement stemming from the prohibition of torture, the relationship between these two cornerstone concepts of international law is not so
